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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the factors that were associated with cabinet 
appointment in the Howard Government 1996 – 2007. Broadly, the factors that are cited as 
important in cabinet appointment in general fall into two categories: the representational and 
the personal. The representational factors are those that are associated related to an 
individual’s role as a “representative”. The personal factors are those that are associated with 
an individual’s personal qualities. Thus, an individual who impresses the selectorate with her 
oratorical or technical skills may stand a higher chance of being selected than another 
individual who does not have such skills. In this paper I will demonstrate that the 
representational factors provide negligible explanation for cabinet appointments in the 
Howard government. In contrast, the personal factors were significantly more important. In 
particular, I identify the level of concreteness/abstractness in a parliamentarian’s first speech 
in parliament as an important factor.  
 
Keywords: Australian politics; Howard government; Cabinet appointment; Data mining; Text 
analysis. 
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Introduction  
The question as to who is likely to be appointed to the highest level of political office is a 
major source of discussion amongst politicians themselves, academics and the popular press. 
However, much of the debate, particularly in Australia, is qualitative and therefore lacks 
predictive or analytical rigour. The central purpose of this paper is to address this by 
analysing the cabinet appointments in the Howard government over the period 1996-2007.  
 
Why did Peter McGauran become a cabinet minister while his brother and fellow 
parliamentarian Julian did not? Similarly, David Kemp became a cabinet minister while his 
brother Rod remained a junior minister. The contention of this paper is that there were 
personal differences that resulted in Peter and David being regarded as being better suited to 
the role than their respective brothers. These characteristics had little to do with the standard 
explanations in the qualitative literature based on representational factors such as region 
represented, party or house (House of Representatives versus senate). I will argue that 
personal characteristics are significantly more important than these representational factors. 
Specifically, I will demonstrate that of the “representational” factors, only geographical 
region (State/Territory) is useful in determining cabinet appointments. However, 
geographical region is very much less predictive of cabinet appointment than personal 
characteristics.  
 
In this paper the representational factors will be taken to mean those factors that the 
selectorate can use to justify the appointment of an individual on the grounds of the overall 
makeup of the parliament. Thus, an individual who represents an electorate in Victoria is 
expected to have a higher probability of being selected for a cabinet position if the overall 
representation of Victorians in parliament rises. Similarly, if the number of  females in 
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parliament rises, the pressure on the selectorate to appoint more women to cabinet positions 
would be expected to rise. The idea here is that cabinet appointments  are determined by the 
need to reflect the various competing interests of the parliament in the cabinet. 
 
Empirical Research on Cabinet Appointment 
    
 
    
The empirical literature on ministerial selection is actually weighted towards de-selection. 
Furthermore, although there are many studies that deal with cabinet formation and durability, 
very few studies attempt to isolate the specific characteristics of individuals who are selected 
to be ministers.  
 
An example of the de-selection literature is Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2007). This 
study examines the influences on a minister’s “risk” of losing their position in cabinet. A Cox 
proportional hazards framework is used to model the time to the resignation of a minister 
with the major finding that Oxbridge education and female gender have a significant effect on 
reducing hazard. Ministerial rank is also significant, having the effect of reducing risk while 
experience significantly increases risk. Berlinski, Dewan and Dowding (2010) which  
examines the effect of ministerial performance and that of the government as a whole on the 
likelihood that a minister will resign. The study uses the number of calls for the resignation of 
the minister reported in The Times as the measure of ministerial performance and the measure 
of performance for the government is the number of call for the resignation of the other 
ministers reported in The Times (Berlinski et al 2010: 562). Observable traits of ministers 
controlled for are gender, educational background, rank and nobility as well as whether the 
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individual had experience in a previous government and whether she received a resignation 
call in that government. The study shows that, where a minister faces a first resignation call, 
her hazard rate rises relative to that of a colleague who has not had any call for her 
resignation. For a second and subsequent resignation call the hazard rate rises again. For a 
minister who has no calls for his/her resignation, a unit increase in the cumulative calls for 
resignations of other ministers decreases her hazard rate.  
This study gives a good indication of the reasons why a minister might be de-selected but it 
does not give us an insight into reasons why a parliamentarian who is not a minister might be 
selected to be a minister.  
 
There is a significant stream of the literature that deals with cabinet durability (Alt 1975; 
King, Alt, Burns and Laver 1990; Grofman and van Roosendaal 1997). This literature deals 
with the extent to which cabinets as a whole are likely to change. The variables used to 
explain cabinet durability are based on the political and institutional factors that influence 
cabinet formation. Such variables include party strength, ideological composition of parties 
that form the government coalition, fractionalisation and constraints on the leader to call early 
elections and a number of similar variables. There is some evidence that these standard 
factors that are associated with cabinet duration are unrelated to ministerial de-selection 
(Huber and Martinez-Gallardo 2008).  
 
One of the earliest studies of ministerial selection is Buck (1963) which compares UK MPs 
who did not rise to CM positions with those who did. The major finding is that the MPs who 
entered parliament at an earlier age and those who received an early promotion to junior roles 
such as parliamentary private secretary were more likely to become senior ministers.  Buck 
concludes that it is those who have deliberately chosen a career in politics that become senior 
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ministers. Such individuals enter the House of Commons at an earlier age and “…seize the 
opportunity…” for promotion once there (Buck 1963: 631). 
 
One of the few recent studies that directly addresses the issue of personal characteristics 
associated with cabinet appointment is Kerby (2009). Using data for the period 1935-2008 
and a Cox proportional hazards approach, this study uses the time from becoming a member 
of the government party to the time of appointment to cabinet to model the probability that a 
given MP will experience an appointment event at time T given that she has “survived”  up to 
that point without the event occurring. Those MPs who cease to be a member of the 
government party before they are appointed to cabinet are treated as censored. The implicit 
idea here is that those who are appointed earlier are considered more suitable than those who 
are not. The two extremes of suitability are represented by the member who is appointed to 
cabinet but does not yet have a seat in the HOC and the permanent backbencher (Kerby 2009: 
596). The independent variables are classified by Kerby as personal and political. The 
personal variables include those that members bring to parliament as new members such as 
are gender, university education, legal training and age at appointment. There are also 
personal factors that vary after becoming members such as previous ministerial experience, 
margin of victory in the MP’s electorate, and whether the MP has challenged the PM for 
leadership. Political factors are the share of seats held by the government party in the MP’s 
region (Western Canada, Ontario, Quebec and Atlantic Canada), the size in percentage of the 
government party’s majority, a dummy variable for Liberal party status, and prime minister’s 
term (1-5). The study does not include Senators because senators are not elected in the 
Canadian system, nor are they generally appointed to cabinet positions (Kerby 2009: 609). 
The general findings are that female gender, legal education, university education and age up 
to 42 increase chance of being appointed to cabinet with legal education being the most 
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influential. Also important are previous ministerial experience is highly significant and being 
a leadership challenger. For each unit increase in the MP’s electoral majority there is a 1% 
increase in chance of appointment, indicating that there is an advantage for MPs who do well 
electorally. In contrast to the personal vote share, the government’s vote share in the MP’s 
region is slightly negatively associated with chance of appointment, indicating that an MP 
who wishes to become a CM is at an advantage if her party does not do well in her region. 
Another finding is that an MP who is not appointed in the PM’s first term suffers a significant 
decrease in their chances of appointment to cabinet in the PM’s subsequent terms. Those who 
are not selected early are highly unlikely to be selected subsequently.  
The study shows that possession of a legal education is likely to be a useful indicator of 
future success as a CM.  This supports the idea that education is likely to be an important 
factor. However, it is worth noting that, in this particular instance, it is not the education per 
se that is being selected for. Kerby (personal communication, August 1 2011) has pointed out 
that in an interview with a particular Canadian Prime Minister it emerged that there was a 
tendency to select lawyers for cabinet positions in the Canadian parliament because 
individuals who had been screened by the Bar association were less likely to have “skeletons 
in the closet”. 
  
O’Malley (2006) uses logistic regression to analyse the institutional, legal and political 
influences on the selection of ministers in the Irish Taoisigh. This study explores ministerial 
selection in a context of a very small pool of potential ministers. Due to the size and nature of 
the institution, 30 members must be chosen for junior and cabinet roles out of the 
approximately 80 members who are legally and politically eligible. Furthermore, the pool is 
such that interpersonal rivalries as well as loyalties to play a significant part in ministerial 
appointment. Another important factor that differentiates the Taoisigh from other comparable 
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systems is that the turnover of members of the legislature is quite low. This situation, coupled 
with the relatively small numbers to draw from, makes it difficult to dismiss CMs because a 
dismissal is likely to have a significant negative effect on personal relations in the party. All 
these factors lead to a situation in which reshuffles are less common than in other 
Westminster systems such as the UK and Canada (O’Malley 2006: 320). Variables included 
in the models are age, years since first elected, a dummy taking the value of 1 if the member 
has tertiary (“third level”) education, personal vote as a proportion of the electoral quota,  a 
dummy taking the value of 1 if the member had previously been a junior minister, the 
percentage party vote in the member’s constituency, a dummy taking the value of 1 if the 
member is in the junior government party of a coalition, and a dummy taking the value of 1 if 
the member is from Dublin and environs. There are three models: a combined parties model 
and models for the two main parties Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael.  
 
Age is not significant in any of the models and, according to O’Malley, this is because 
ministers are appointed on the basis of how well known they are (O’Malley 2006: 331). The 
close personal nature of the small pool means that a member will not be appointed to cabinet 
unless she is known and the only way to get known is to have experience in parliament. 
Which explains why the variable representing “Years since first elected” is significantly 
positively associated with cabinet appointment. Tertiary education is significantly (p<.001) 
associated with increased odds of being a CM. The effect of having a high proportion of 
personal votes as a proportion of the electoral quota is a powerful influence on cabinet 
membership. However, the effect of the party vote in the member’s constituency is only 
significant in the Fianna Fáil model (odds ratio = 308.61, p<.001). Having held a junior 
ministerial post is a positive influence on future cabinet membership for the full model (odds 
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ratio 1.64, p<.05) and the Fianna Fáil model (odds ratio 3.26, p<.001).  It is interesting to 
note that the geographical variable (Dublin or Environs) is not significant. 
 
Kam, Bianco, Sened and Smyth (2010) uses a cross-sectional approach to examine the 
appointment of CMs and shadow CMs in the UK parliament over the period 1987-2005 on 
the basis of the extent to which they represent the ideological position of the other MPs in the 
broader party. The major finding is that the several variables are significantly associated with 
appointment to cabinet/shadow cabinet in the UK parliament. These include being promoted 
in the first term promotion (positive coefficient), parliamentary experience at the start of the 
term (positive coefficient); parliamentary experience squared at the beginning of the term 
(negative coefficient), Oxbridge education, being in government (negative coefficient), and 
dissenting roll call votes in the last term (negative coefficient). Ideological variables derived 
from a survey of MPs were added into the model. The findings indicate that an MP who is 
ideologically closer to their party’s general ideological position is significantly more likely to 
be appointed to cabinet even after controlling for the standard ministerial selection variables 
cited above. The distance between an MP’s ideological position and that of their leader was 
not significant. Furthermore, the coefficients for experience (.409, p<.01) and experience 
squared (-.009, p<.01) indicate that there is a negative quadratic relationship between 
experience and the likelihood of appointment such that the likelihood of appointment rises 
over the first 23 years and then declines thereafter. 
 
 
The Analysis of Cabinet Appointments in the Howard Government. 
 
The Independent Variables 
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The Australian Federal Parliament consists of the House of Representatives (the Lower 
House) and the Senate (the Upper House). The size of the Houses varies according to changes 
in the population of Australia. In 1996 the HOR had 148 Members and the Senate had 72. By 
2007 These numbers had risen to 150 and 76 respectively. Government is formed by the part 
or coalition with the majority in the HOR. 
 
For the purposes of determining cabinet minister selection we are only concerned with the 
numbers of individuals in the government party/coalition because in the Australian system 
ministers are typically only chosen from the government parliamentarians. 
 
Table 1 shows the number of LNPC members in parliament over the period 1996 – 2007 
according to their representational factors. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
The table shows that the total number of LNPC parliamentarians varied from a low of 114 in 
2001 to a high of 131 in 1998.  The Senate constituted approximately 30% of LNPC 
parliamentarians (HOR + Senate). Females constituted a fairly stable number of LNPC 
parliamentarians with a low of 23 on 1996 and a high of 26 in 2000 – 20003 and 2006 – 
2007. Smaller geographical areas such as the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital 
Territory supplied significantly fewer LNPC parliamentarians than the other states, with 
NSW supplying the bulk with a high of 35 in 1997 – 8 and a low of 32 in 2005. There was 
significant variation in the number of Nationals (the junior partner in the LNPC. For the 
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period 1996 – 2001the number was relatively high at 23 but declined to a low of 15 in 2005 
and remained at 16 for 2006-7. 
 
The importance of the representational factors is that the literature on ministerial appointment 
emphasises them as important factors in the determination of ministerial appointment. Thus, 
the theory is that LNPC parliamentarians from the larger states such as NSW and Victoria 
will have a higher likelihood of becoming ministers than those from the smaller states such as 
Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania.  Furthermore, to the extent 
that the selectorate emphasises the need to represent women in cabinet, being a female will 
have an influence on the likelihood of selection. Similar arguments will hold for Senators and 
Nationals.  Thus, I will include in the analysis binary variables for the geographical variables 
(NSW, Vic, Qld, SA, WA, Tas, NT and ACT), female gender, being a member of the Senate 
and being a member of the smaller party in the LNPC Coalition, the Nationals. 
 
 
So far we have considered the representational factors only. However, it is also important to 
consider the personal factors. The personal factors I will concentrate on are those that have 
been found to be well supported in the literature as being associated with cabinet 
appointment. Thus, age and experience will be examined. I will also include a binary variable 
representing legal education. Kerby (2009) found strong evidence for an association between 
legal education and the likelihood of cabinet appointment and a weaker association between 
tertiary education in general and ministerial appointment. Furthermore, there is evidence in 
the US research that those individuals with a legal education rise faster through the 
congressional committee system and attain higher overall positions. Thus, it is likely that 
legal education as opposed to general tertiary education is likely to be the appropriate 
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approach. The final variable I will consider is a variable that measures the abstractness of a 
parliamentarian’s speech. The idea here is to get a measure of the abstractness/concreteness 
inherent in a parliamentarian’s conception of the world. The level of concreteness revealed in 
an individual’s speech has been found to be associated with cognitive outlook known as the 
psychological level of construal Trope and Lieberman (2010). I will return to a discussion of 
this concept below. Abstractness/concreteness is measured by scoring speech samples from 
parliamentarians on the basis of the average concreteness of the nouns in the samples. This 
process is based on a selection of 925 common nouns which were scored by Paivio Yuille 
and Madigan (1968) on the extent to which the noun was easily representable to the senses. 
The speech sample chosen is the first or maiden speech. This is an ideal speech sample 
because all parliamentarians make this speech in essentially the same circumstances and at 
the same stage of their career. Furthermore, the speech is highly likely to be substantially 
prepared by the parliamentarian as it is delivered at a time when they are beginning their 
parliamentary careers and therefore are unlikely to have the resources available to employ 
“ghost” writers. 
 
 
With these representational and personal variables I have covered a substantial number of the 
types of factors that are likely to be associated with cabinet appointment. Two variables that 
were discussed in the literature above that we have not included are electoral margin and 
ideology. I will explain why these have not been included. 
 
The fundamental reason for not including a variable for electoral margin is that the two 
houses of parliament from which ministers are drawn use fundamentally different electoral 
systems. The HOR uses the alternative vote in single member local level constituencies while 
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the Senate uses the single transferable  vote in multiple member state level constituencies. 
What this means is that there is a fundamentally different way of determining the support for 
members of the HOR as opposed to the Senate. As such it seems difficult to come up with a 
consistent measure for HOR and Senate parliamentarians. 
 
Kam et al (2010) found that ideology was a significant factor in the allocation of frontbench 
positions. While it would be ideal to include such a variable in the current study it is not 
possible because the survey data that was used in Kam et al is not available for the Australian 
federal cohort.  
 
The Structure of the Data   
 
The study design uses 5 cross sections over the period 1996 -2007. The cross sections are 
taken at times that reflect changes in parliament due to elections and consequent re-shuffles. 
The data are taken from the yearly Hansard for the first parliamentary session of the year 
after an election or, in the case of 2007, after a significant re-shuffle leading up to an election. 
Thus, the 1996 data show the situation at the first parliamentary session in April 1996 which 
followed the election of March 1996.  For the elections that took place in the middle of the 
year, the changes in the makeup of parliament are not manifested in the data until the 
following year. For example, the changes that took place in the October 1998 election are not 
reflected in the data until the first session for 1999. The same situation exists for the elections 
in November 2001 and October 2004. In order to get cross sections that represent the 
situation as it existed after the elections over the period, it is necessary to use the data from 
1996, 1999, 2002 and 2005. Also included is the cross section from the first session for 2007 
which represents the final reshuffle before the November 2007 election. Thus, we have data 
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for five cross sections, the analysis of which should capture any patterns in the way cabinet 
posts were awarded, if any. 
 
The data from all five cross sections illustrates the long-term structure of the parliament as 
well as that of the cabinet for the period 1996-2007.  Table 3.19 summarises the data.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The pooled data involves 192 individuals and provides 611 observations of “events” over the 
five cross sections. Of the 611 events there were 527 non-CM events and 84 CM events. 
Thus, the overall probability of a cabinet appointment event was 14% (84/611). Clearly, there 
are some observable trends in the descriptive data. For example, over the five cross sections, 
the parliamentary proportion of females was .21 (126/611) yet the cabinet proportion of 
females was only .12 (10/84). Thus, there is some indication that women were under-
represented in cabinet. Similarly, Queensland was under-represented given that the 
Parliamentary proportion of Queenslanders was .22 while their cabinet representation was 
.11. A similar situation occurred for WA with parliamentary proportion of .12 and a cabinet 
proportion of .06. NSW was over-represented with a parliamentary proportion of .27 and 
cabinet proportion of .38. South Australian was similarly over-represented with parliamentary 
and cabinet proportions of .12 and .2 respectively. The parliamentary and cabinet proportions 
for the other representational factors seem reasonably close. In the case of the personal 
factors there seems to be a difference in the proportion of parliamentarians with a legal 
qualification (.27) and CMs with a legal qualification (.58) indicating that having a legal 
qualification is a positive influence on cabinet selection.  There is evidence that the average 
CM was older than the average CM at 51.73 and 50.8 respectively. Similarly, the average 
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experience of CMs was13.95 years while that of non-CMs was7.92.  Finally, there is a 
marginal difference in the concreteness of the maiden speeches of CMs (4.34) as opposed to 
non-CMs (4.54), indicating that CMs use less concrete language. 
 
Given the above dataset the  next stage is to use a method of analysing the factors that lead to 
cabinet appointments. As I will argue, K-Means clustering can be used for this purpose. 
 
Data Mining with K-Means Clustering 
 
Essentially, k-means clustering works by creating ‘k’ clusters based on the dependent 
variables. The centres of these clusters are determined by the independent variables. TO 
classify a given case as belonging to one category or another, the geometric distance from 
that case to the centre of another cluster is determined. The case is classified as a member of 
the class with the closest cluster.   
 
The choice of K-Means clustering for data mining is by no means a usual choice in data 
mining. There are several other competing induction methods that have been found to be 
more accurate than K-Means clustering. Sherrod (2009) found that, of different classification 
algorithms used on 18 data sets, K-Means clustering provided the best solution for only 1 of 
these. The choice of K-Means clustering for the current application was made on the basis of 
practical efficacy: of all other methods including ANNs, SVMs, Random Forests, Logistic 
Regression and Genetic Programming, K-Means clustering was the best performer. This 
finding underscores the observation in machine learning that there is no a priori way of 
determining what induction method will work best with a given data set.  
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The K-Means clustering was implemented with the Enterprise version of DTREG. The 611 
cases were divided into a 306 case training set (TS) and a 305 case external holdout set 
(EHOS). The HOS was used only for testing the models built using the TS. The procedure 
was to build a number of models using different combinations of the independent variables 
are compare the models on the basis of classification accuracy. Two methods of classification 
accuracy were used: Leave–one-out cross validation was used to test the model created with 
the TS (n = 306). Thus, effectively 306 models were created and tested on each individual 
case in turn. The reported accuracy is the average accuracy over the 306 models. The model 
was subsequently validated using the HOSCV (n = 305). Given that there is some debate as 
to which of these is the ideal method of model validation, the classification accuracies for 
both methods will be reported. Given that each method is tested over 300 times, the summary 
statistics should provide a good estimate of the accuracies using each method. It should be 
noted that both methods provide similar accuracy statistics which indicates that there is a high 
degree of consistency. 
 
The Models 
 
Several different combinations of independent variables were used to create a number of 
models. It should be noted that in all models the continuous variables were standardised. The 
idea here is that in K-Means clustering the clusters are created assuming that no particular 
variable is more important than another. With unstandardized variables those with the highest 
absolute values have a greater influence on the assignment of cases to clusters.  Empirically it 
has been found that KNN performs better when the continuous variables are standardised so 
that they are all considered equally.  
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The Full Model: 
 
The full model consists of all independent variables. The personal variables are Age, Age 
squared, Parlage, Parlage Squared, Experience, Experience Squared, Conc and Law. The 
representational variables are Female, Senate, National Party and the eight geographical 
variables NSW, Vic, Qld, WA, SA, Tas, ACT and NT. Clearly there will be some 
redundancy in this selection of variables. In the case of the personal variables, Parlage is 
calculated by subtracting Experience from Age so including all three variables is unlikely to 
all more information. Similarly, including all geographical variables has the potential to 
provide more information than required and if the induction method chosen was logistic 
regression we might need to eliminated one category to prevent over-determination. 
However, as KNN is being used it is possible that these issues will not be a problem. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the classification accuracy of the full model.  
 
Table 3 about here 
 
At first glance model seems accurate, with LOOCV and HOSCV accuracies of .90 and .85 
respectively. However, the accuracy is largely due to the high specificity of the model. In 
other words, the model is able to efficiently determine who is not a CM but is not able to 
efficiently determine who is a CM. The ability to detect those who are CMs at a given cross 
section in time, as indicated by the sensitivity, is not above chance with the LOOCV 
sensitivity at 69% (99% CI =  48% - 86%) and the HOSCV sensitivity at 62% (99% CI =  
41% - 80%).  
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Before moving on to other models it is worthwhile looking at the relative importance of each 
variable in the model. Table 4 shows the ranking of variable importance with 100 
representing  the benchmark highest importance and other figures representing lower levels 
of importance in relation to the top ranking variable. Thus, a variable with a ranking of 50% 
is of half the importance of a variable with a ranking of 100%.  
 
Table 4 about here 
 
The importance ranking of variables demonstrates a phenomenon that we will see is common 
to all models – the personal factors are generally more important than the representational 
factors. The top six variables are personal with importance rankings ranging from 100% for 
age to 64% for ExpSq. The next variable is a representational variable Senate, with an 
importance ranking of 47%. Following this is the final personal variable, Law, with an 
importance of 45%. All variables below law are representational variables. The interesting 
point about this is that the model provides good evidence that it is the personal factors that 
are the most important in determining cabinet appointments.  
 
The Representational Model: 
 
A second model was created which consisted of only the representational variables. 
Classification accuracies for this model are presented in Table 5. 
 
Table 5 about here 
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Clearly, this model is not efficient because the ability of the model to detect CMs is not 
apparent. The sensitivities of the LOOCV and the HOSCV are 38% and 24% respectively. 
The apparent overall accuracy of the model of 75% - 70% is due to the high default 
specificity. In other words, the unbalanced data set with 86% of the cases being non-CMs 
results in a seemingly high overall accuracy but this is due to the fact that 86% of the cases 
would be accurate if we made no attempt to model CM selection and merely assumed that all 
cases were non-CMs.  
 
Notwithstanding that the classification accuracy of the model is not efficient, the analysis of 
the importance of the variables in the model gives us another insight into the causal effects of 
the independent variables. Table 6 shows that the most important variable in this model is 
Female.  
 
Table 6 about here 
 
In the Full Model, the representational factor with the greatest influence was Senate which in 
this model is fourth in importance after Female (100%), WA (84%) and SA (57%).  
 
A similarity between this model and the Full Model is that the three smallest geographical 
regions Tas, NT and ACT are the least important. This makes sense in that Tasmania 
provided very few CMs over the period while the NT and ACT provided none.  
 
The Optimum Model: 
The insights gained from the first two models give us some insights into how we might create 
an optimum model. There is a clear role for the personal variables tso these should be 
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included in subsequent models. There is a high degree of variability in the importance of two 
of the non-geographical representational variables, Female and Senate, as between model 1 
and 2 so it is difficult to determine whether these variables provide more signal than noise. 
The remaining non-gepgraphical representational variable, NP, seems to have a low overall 
influence on the outcome, accounting for only 16% of the influence on the outcome in the 
first model and 25% in the second. Finally, the smaller geographical representational 
variables, NT, ACT and Tas seem to have little influence in either model. What this suggests 
is that a model consisting of the personal variables and the major geographical variables 
should provide a good solution. 
 
Table 7 shows the classification accuracy of the optimum model which consists  of the 8 
personal variables and the five major geographical representational variables. 
 
Table 7 about here 
 
This model is clearly efficient at detecting CMs with sensitivities for the LOOCV and 
HOSCV of 79% (99% CI = 58% - 92%) and 83% (99% CI = 64% - 95%) respectively. The 
ability to detect non-CMs is also apparent in that the LOOCV and HOSCV accuracies are 
72% (99% CI = 64% - 0.79%) and 73% (99% CI = 65% - 0.79%) respectively. The 
accuracies of the LOOCV 73% and the HOSCV 74% indicate that this model is able to 
classify both CM and non CM events well beyond chance alone (p<.01).  
 
Table # shows the relative importance of the variables in the model. As with the previous 
models, the personal factors are the most important. The first 7 variables are personal 
variables. The eighth is geographical, NSW, accounting for 40% of the relative importance 
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on the outcome. The ninth is the final personal variable, Law, also accounting for 40% of the 
relative importance . The final four variables are the four remaining geographical variables 
SA (24%), Vic (16%), WA (11%) and Qld (8%).  
 
Table 8 about here 
 
 
Discussion 
 
The analysis above shows that there is good evidence that it is the personal attributes that are 
the most important in determining who will be a CM. All of the personal characteristics other 
than Law were of more importance than the representational variables in all models. In two of 
the models Law was preceded by a representational variable but then the remaining 
representational variables followed Law. In other words, Law was more important than most 
of the representational variables.  
 
Another finding is that the significant geographical variables are more important than the 
other representational variables. [Run model with personals and non-geographical variables]. 
 
Given the above findings I will now consider the reasons why the important variables are 
have their influence. The first step in this process is to get an idea of the direction of the 
influence of each of the variables on the dependent variable. With k-means clustering, as with 
many data mining methods it is not possible to summarise the directional influence of 
variables on the dependent variable due to complex interactions and non-linear relationships 
between the dependent and independent variables. However we can get an idea of the 
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influence by perturbing each independent variable and determining the influence on the 
dependent variable. One other complication is that, for each time related variable, a squared 
value is calculated. Thus, for Age, Experience and Parlage and there are variables for Age 
Squared, Experience Squared, Parlage Squared respectively. The reason for this is that 
studies such as Kam et al (2010) show that there is a non-linear relationship between 
experience and the likelihood of appointment.  For the purposes of determining the influence 
of the time variables on the dependent variable it makes little sense to perturb a variable and 
its square independently. That is, if an individual’s age rises their age squared also rises. For 
this reason both the original and the squared variables are perturbed simultaneously to 
determine the directional influences. The results are as presented in Table 9: 
 
Table 9 about here 
 
The Age variables (Age and Age Squared) had no discernible effect on the dependent 
variable. Nor did NSW, Vic or WA. However, removing any of these from the model 
resulted in a lowering of the classification accuracy. This suggests that the variables are 
important but in a non-linear way. As such it is difficult to interpret how these variables 
should be interpreted.  Notwithstanding this finding it is worthwhile noting that in the case of 
Age it has been found that, where the Age is modelled using a linear equation, there is a 
negative association between age and the likelihood of cabinet appointment; where Age is 
modelled as a quadratic equation, there is a negative quadratic association between age and 
appointment to cabinet with an inflexion point some time in the 40s. Furthermore, this pattern 
seems to hold for a number of positions in which appointment is dependent on high level 
performance in authoritative positions.  Numerous reasons could be offered as to why this 
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occurs. For the purposes of the current study it suffices to say that the patterns detected in 
other jurisdictions and domains seems to be present in the Australian Federal arena. 
 
The Experience variables (Experience and Experience Squared) are positively associated with 
the dependent variable. O’Malley (2006) found that the number of years since first elected 
(experience) is positively associated with ministerial appointment in the Irish parliament. 
Furthermore, retaining individuals with experience seems to be important. In November 
2001, a reshuffle was described in The Canberra Times in the following terms: “Howard's 
desire to push his own type of coalition politician, the need for new talent, and the need to 
retain experience at the highest levels were the forces behind his reshuffle” (Canberra Times 
November 25 2001, p20). However, there is some evidence that too much experience can be 
detrimental. For example, Kam et al (2010) found that there was a negative quadratic effect 
of experience on the likelihood of ministerial promotion such that the probability of 
appointment rises until a peak of 15 years and then falls off. Similarly, Dalvean (2012) found 
a negative quadratic relationship between experience and the likelihood of appointment to 
cabinet. The inflexion point occurred at 17 years indicating that at this level of experience an 
individual is likely to be deemed to be “too experienced”.  
 
There is a negative influence of the Parlage variables (Parlage and Parlage Squared) on the 
dependent variable. There is a negative association between the age at which an individual 
arrives in parliament and their likelihood of achieving high political office. This phenomenon 
has been noted in a number of contexts. In general, the literature finds that those who arrive 
in parliament earlier are more successful in achieving higher office because they are more 
ambitious. Buck (1963) pointed out, that in the UK House of commons, “[m]inisterial 
aspirants seize an early opportunity to begin their advance in the official hierarchy, and in 
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most cases they have also begun their career in the Commons at a relatively early age” (Buck 
1963: 629). Schlesinger (1966: 176) makes the same point: "[t]he younger a man is when he 
enters politics, the greater the range of his ambitions and the likelihood of his developing a 
career commitment to politics". The point here is that it arriving in parliament at an earlier 
age is a proxy for ambition: those who enter parliament at an earlier age have a higher 
baseline level of ambition and this higher level of ambition plays out over the career of the 
parliamentarian such that the parliamentarian is more likely to grasp opportunities as they 
arise.  
 
Having a legal qualification is positively associated with the dependent variable. An 
association between reaching high political office has been found in a number of different 
political arenas. Kerby (2009), for example found that having a legal qualification was more 
strongly associated with cabinet appointment than having a tertiary education in general. 
Dalvean (2012) found that a legal education was associated with cabinet appointment 
whereas no other field of education was significantly associated with cabinet appointment. In 
the USA context it has been found that legally trained individuals are more likely to rise to 
senior positions in the most prestigious committees than non-legally trained individuals 
(Miller 1995). 
 
Many reasons have been put forward to explain this phenomenon. Some cite technical skill 
(Morgan 1966, 156-57, 366, 343-44, cited in Miller 1995: 77). According to Miller, “[t]hese 
differences [in technical skill] are subtle, but extremely important” (Miller 1995: 77). 
Another explanation is that those who have legal training are more politically ambitious. On 
this account, part of the process of attaining a high political rank is to obtain a legal 
qualification. Thus, there is a correlation between attaining high political office and having a 
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legal qualification because the underlying cause of both phenomena is ambition. The problem 
with this explanation is that Dalvean (2012) controls for ambition by using a proxy for 
ambition (Parlage) and yet having a legal qualification is still significant. This suggests that 
having a legal qualification is an independent influence on becoming a cabinet minister. 
 
Two studies that cast light on the possible explanation for the positive effects of having a 
legal qualification is are  Lehman et al (1988) and Amsel et al (1991). The benefit of these 
studies is that they specifically examined the cognitive styles of lawyers as opposed to non-
lawyers. 
 
 Lehman (1988) found that layers differ from other groups in that they are less inclined to 
analyse the world in probabilistic terms. This may be due to their training in legal causation 
which encourages a world view that is significantly simpler than the more scientific world 
view (Culhane 1997: 190). The upshot is that the legally trained may have an advantage in 
discussions with their political colleagues as well as with the media in that they are able to 
present simplified world views which may be more palatable than the complex realities. 
 
Amsel et al (1991) found that the legally trained are more likely than other groups to use 
counterfactual reasoning. The major benefit of this is that counterfactual thinking primes 
individuals to consider alternatives (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000: 385). Thus, lawyers may 
be more likely to be able to consider a greater number of alternatives than their non-legally 
trained colleagues due to their training in counterfactual reasoning. Being able to generate 
more alternatives may be of benefit in that the cabinet selectorate will note that such 
individuals are a better source of ideas than those who generate fewer ideas. 
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Concreteness is negatively associated with CM. What this indicates is that CMs are likely to 
have a relatively high level of psychological level of construal (Trope and Lieberman 2010). 
Psychological level of construal (PLC) is the extent to which an individual conceptualises 
their experience from a global (abstract) as opposed to a local (concrete) point of view. The 
link between PLC and language use is that those with a higher level of PLC (that is, a more 
global outlook) tend to use more abstract language than those with a lower PLC. 
Concreteness is associated with a proximate level of construal and as the level of construal 
becomes more distal the details become more abstract and general (Liberman and Trope 
2008, p1203). The important point is that concreteness as measured in linguistic samples can 
be used as a proxy for the level of construal.  Liberman and Trope describe the importance of 
the PLC thus: 
 
“Human history is associated with expanding horizons—traversing 
greater spatial distances (e.g., discovering new continents, space 
travel); forming larger social groups (families versus cities versus 
states versus global institutions); planning and investing in the more 
distant future; and reaching farther back into the past. Human 
development in the first years of life involves acquiring the ability to 
plan for the more distant future, to consider possibilities that are not 
present, and to consider the perspective of more distant people…” 
(Liberman and Trope 2008, p1202). 
 
The implication of this is that CMs, in exhibiting a lower level of concreteness in their speech 
samples are likely to have higher levels of PLC and are therefore more likely to exhibit the 
characteristics associated with “expanding horizons”.  
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Queensland is negatively and South Australia is positively associated with appointment to 
cabinet. Thus, an LNPC parliamentarian who came from Queensland had a disadvantage in 
terms of their likelihood of cabinet appointment while a South Australian had an advantage. 
This seems to reflect long term trends. Table 10 shows the actual number of SA LNPC 
cabinet members as well as the number that would be expected if cabinet positions were 
allocated strictly in terms of the representation of SA LNPC parliamentarians.  
 
Table 10 about here 
 
Clearly there was a long term bias in that the actual number of CMs was 3.5 while the 
expected number was 2.06. In other words, there was a long term trend of including, on 
average, one more SA individual in cabinet than was warranted by the numbers in parliament. 
As shown in Table 11, The situation for Queensland was the reverse: on average the number 
of Queenslanders in cabinet was 1.75 while the number that would be expected given the 
representation of Queenslanders in parliament was 3.56.  
 
Table 11 about here 
 
Although the case of both SA and Qld the lack of fit of parliamentary representation  and 
cabinet appointment was small, it was consistent enough for the modelling procedure to find. 
The implication of this for modelling in general is that the major geographical regions should 
be included in the models because if there is any bias in cabinet appointments, including the 
major geographical regions in the model will increase classification accuracy however if 
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there is no bias then including them will not necessarily decrease the classification accuracy 
of the model.  
 
Summary and Conclusion 
 
In this paper I have presented a model of cabinet selection based on the Howard government 
1997-2007. The model consists of variables for age (Age and Age Squared), experience 
(Experience and Experience Squared), age at the time of entering parliament (Parlage and 
Parlage Squared), Legal qualification, concreteness of language and five binary variables for 
the five major geographical areas. Using these variables a model can be created that has a 
predictive accuracy of 73%-74%.  The model is predictive in that, given data on a given 
coalition parliamentarian who is likely to be appointed as cabinet minister as the result of a 
re-shuffle in a Coalition government. 
However, I have gone beyond creating a merely predictive model in that I have examined the 
important variables in the model and described why they might be associated with cabinet 
appointment. Thus, I have pointed out that there are good reasons why experience should be 
positively associated with cabinet appointment, if only over an initial period in parliament, 
and why the age at which an individual arrives in parliament should be negatively associated 
with cabinet appointment. Furthermore, I have explained why concrete language, as a proxy 
got the PLC should be negatively associated with cabinet appointment. I have also explained 
why the cognitive habits of the legally trained should be useful for an individual aspiring to a 
cabinet position, thus explaining what having a legal qualification should be positively 
associated with cabinet appointment. Finally, I have explained that including geographical 
variables in the model is useful because the predictive accuracy of the model will be 
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increased by including them if there is any bias in the selection of cabinet ministers on the 
basis of geographical origin.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: LNPC Parliamentarians by Representational Factor 1996 -2007 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
HOR + Senate 129 130 131 117 115 114 117 117 116 122 126 126 
Senate  35 36 37 37 35 35 35 35 33 35 39 39 
HOR  94 94 94 80 80 79 82 82 83 87 87 87 
Female  23 25 27 27 26 26 26 26 25 24 26 26 
Vic  27 27 27 24 24 24 23 23 22 24 24 24 
NSW  34 35 35 33 32 32 33 33 33 32 33 33 
Qld  29 29 29 25 24 23 24 24 24 26 28 28 
Tas  7 7 7 5 5 5 5 5 5 7 8 8 
SA  16 16 16 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 14 14 
WA  13 13 14 13 13 13 14 14 14 16 16 16 
ACT  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
NT  2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Nationals  23 23 23 21 19 19 16 16 16 15 16 16 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: LNPC Data - Pooled Cross-sections 
 n Sen Fem Vic NSW Qld Tas SA WA ACT NT NP Law Av' Age Av' Exp Con 
Parl' 611 181 126 122 165 132 32 74 72 5 9 91 167 50.93 8.75 4.51 
Non-CMs 527 159 116 103 133 123 30 57 67 5 9 76 118 50.80 7.92 4.54 
CMs 84 22 10 19 32 9 2 17 5 0 0 15 49 51.73 13.95 4.34 
Parl' Prop'  0.30 0.21 0.20 0.27 0.22 0.05 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.15 0.27 n/a n/a n/a 
Cab' Prop'  0.26 0.12 0.23 0.38 0.11 0.02 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.58 n/a n/a n/a 
  
 
 
Table 3: Classification Accuracy of the Full Model 
  Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy  
LOOCV (n = 306) 0.69 0.94 0.90  
HOSCV (n = 305) 0.62 0.89 0.85  
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Table 4: Variable Importance for the Full Model 
Variable  Importance 
% 
Age  100 
AgeSq         99 
Parlage   98 
ParlageSq   96 
Conc   92 
Exp   91 
ExpSq   64 
Senate   47 
Law   45 
NSW   42 
Female   39 
Qld   37 
Vic    30 
WA     28 
SA    27 
NP   25 
Tas   9 
NT    3 
ACT   2 
 
 
Table 5: Classification Accuracy for the Representational Model 
  Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy  
LOOCV (n = 306) 0.38 0.80 0.75  
HOSCV (n = 305) 0.24 0.77 0.70  
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Table 6: Variable Importance for the Representational Model 
Variable  Importance 
% 
Female  100 
WA   84 
SA   57 
Senate  55 
Vic   51 
Qld   23 
NP   16 
Tas   15 
NT   14 
ACT   2 
 
Table 7: Classification Accuracy of the Optimum Model 
  Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy  
LOOCV (n = 306) 0.79 0.72 0.73  
HOSCV (n = 305) 0.83 0.73 0.74  
 
Table 8: Variable Importance for the Optimum Model 
Variable  Importance 
% 
Age  100 
AgeSq  99 
Parlage  97 
ParlageSq  94 
Exp  89 
Conc  73 
ExpSq  70 
NSW  40 
Law  40 
SA  24 
Vic   16 
WA  11 
Qld   8 
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Table 9: Directional Influence of Independent Variables for the Optimum Model 
Variables      Directional Influence 
Age Variables (Age and Age Squared)   n/a 
Exp' Variables (Exp' and Exp' Squared)   + 
Parlage Variables (Parlage and Parlage Squared) - 
Concreteness     - 
Law      + 
NSW      n/a 
Vic       n/a 
Qld       - 
SA      + 
WA      n/a 
 
 
Table 10: South Australian CM Representation 1996-2007 
Yr: 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Av' 
No. SA CMs 4 4 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 2 3.5 
Exp' No. SA CMs 1.9 1.8 2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2.2 2 1.9 2 2.06 
 
 
Table 11: Queensland CM Representation 1996-2007 
Yr: 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Av' 
No. Qld CMs 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 3 3 1.75 
Exp' No. Qld CMs 3.4 3.3 3.5 3.6 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.8 4 3.56 
 
 
